ביאור:בבלי כתובות דף ג
מועד: שבת עירובין פסחים יומא סוכה ביצה ראש השנה תענית מגילה מועד קטן חגיגה
נשים: יבמות כתובות נדרים נזיר סוטה גיטין קידושין
נזיקין: בבא קמא בבא מציעא בבא בתרא סנהדרין מכות שבועות ע"ז הוריות
קדשים: זבחים מנחות חולין בכורות ערכין תמורה כריתות מעילה תמיד
מסכת כתובות: ב ג ד ה ו ז ח ט י יא יב יג יד טו טז יז יח יט כ כא כב כג כד כה כו כז כח כט ל לא לב לג לד לה לו לז לח לט מ מא מב מג מד מה מו מז מח מט נ נא נב נג נד נה נו נז נח נט ס סא סב סג סד סה סו סז סח סט ע עא עב עג עד עה עו עז עח עט פ פא פב פג פד פה פו פז פח פט צ צא צב צג צד צה צו צז צח צט ק קא קב קג קד קה קו קז קח קט קי קיא קיב | הדף במהדורה הרגילה
עמוד א (דלג לעמוד ב)
ומי איכא מידי דמדאורייתא לא להוי גט , ומשום 'צנועות' ומשום 'פרוצות' שרינן אשת איש לעלמא?
איכא דאמרי: אמר רבא: 'וכן לענין גיטין' !
אלמא קסבר רבא יש אונס בגיטין!
מיתיבי [גיטין פ"ז מ"ג]: "הרי זה גיטיך אם לא באתי מכאן ועד שנים עשר חדש", ומת בתוך שנים עשר חדש - אינו גט; מת - הוא דאינו גט, הא חלה הרי זה גט!
לעולם אימא לך: חלה נמי אינו גט, והיא גופה קא משמע לן: דאין גט לאחר מיתה.
אין גט לאחר מיתה? הא תנא ליה רישא!
דלמא לאפוקי מדרבותינו.
תא שמע [גיטין פ"ז מ"ח]: "מעכשיו 'אם לא באתי מכאן ועד שנים עשר חדש", ומת בתוך שנים עשר חדש - הרי זה גט מאי לאו - הוא הדין לחלה?
לא, מת דוקא; דלא ניחא ליה דתפול קמי יבם.
תא שמע מההוא דאמר להו "אי לא אתינא מכאן ועד שלשים יום ליהוי גיטא" אתא בסוף תלתין יומין ופסקיה מברא ואמר להו "חזו דאתאי! חזו דאתאי!" ואמר שמואל: לא שמיה מתיא!
אונסא דשכיח שאני: דכיון דאיבעי ליה לאתנויי ולא אתני - איהו הוא דאפסיד אנפשיה.
אמר רב שמואל בר יצחק: לא שנו אלא מתקנת עזרא ואילך שאין בתי דינין קבועין אלא בשני ובחמישי, אבל קודם תקנת עזרא שבתי דינין קבועין בכל יום  - אשה נשאת בכל יום.
קודם תקנת עזרא מאי דהוה הוה?
הכי קאמר: אי איכא בתי דינין דקבועין - האידנא - כקודם תקנת עזרא: אשה נשאת בכל יום.
הא בעינן שקדו ?
דטריח ליה .
מאי 'שקדו' ?
דתניא [תוספתא כתובות פ"א מ"א [ליברמן]]: 'מפני מה אמרו "בתולה נשאת ליום הרביעי"? שאם היה לו טענת בתולים היה משכים לבית דין;
ותנשא באחד בשבת, ואם היה לו טענת בתולים היה משכים לבית דין [ביום שני]?
'שקדו חכמים על תקנת בנות ישראל שיהא אדם טורח בסעודה שלשה ימים: אחד בשבת ושני בשבת ושלישי בשבת, וברביעי כונסה;
ומסכנה ואילך  נהגו העם לכנוס בשלישי ולא מיחו בידם חכמים;
ובשני לא יכנוס ;
ואם מחמת האונס  – מותר;
ומפרישין את החתן מן הכלה לילי שבת תחלה  מפני שהוא עושה חבורה'.
אמר רבה: דאמרי 'בתולה הנשאת ביום הרביעי תיבעל להגמון תחלה'.B
האי סכנה? 'אונס' הוא!
משום דאיכא צנועות דמסרן נפשייהו לקטלא ואתיין לידי סכנה.C
ולידרוש להו דאונס שרי? 
אי הכי בשלישי נמי אתי [ההגמון] ובעיל ?
ובשני לא יכנוס, ואם מחמת האונס מותר:
אמר רבא: דאמרי: שר צבא בא לעיר .
לא, צריכא דאתי וקבע [ואינו מתכוין לעזוב].
בשלישי מיהא לכנוס ?
אספרווא דידיה  - בשלישי קאתו.
THE RABANAN'S AUTHORITY TO UPROOT A MARRIAGE
QUESTIONS: The Gemara states that in certain situations, the Rabanan – in order to end a marriage -- uproot the Kidushin so that the marriage will no longer exist. The situation discussed in our Gemara is when a person gives a Get to his wife on condition that he does not return, and then circumstances beyond his control prevent him from returning. Even though the Get is not a valid Get mid'Oraisa (since a fulfillment of a condition against one's will is not considered as though one fulfilled the condition), the Rabanan instituted that the Get does take effect (for the reasons that the Gemara describes). How can the Rabanan make the Get valid when, mid'Oraisa, it is not valid? The Gemara explains that the Rabanan make the Get effective by implementing their authority to uproot the Kidushin (retroactively), "Afke'inhu Rabanan l'Kidushei Minei."
Another example of a situation in which the Rabanan remove the Kidushin is when a man sends a Get to his wife and then annuls the Get after the Shali'ach has departed, without informing the Shali'ach of the annulment.
Although the Get is not valid when the Shali'ach gives it to the woman, the Rabanan make it take effect by uprooting the Kidushin.
How does this mechanism of uprooting the Get work? When the Rabanan uproot the Kidushin, is it considered as though the couple were never married? If so, it should be possible to remove the status of a Mamzer in a situation
where a married woman committed adultery or was raped and had a child from the union; although the child is a Mamzer, it should be possible to make the child legitimate by having the Kidushin uprooted retroactively (such as by sending her a Get with a Shali'ach and then annulling the Get)! Similarly, a man could save his wife from being punished with Misah, where she committed adultery, in this manner as well!
In addition, the PNEI YEHOSHUA points out that if the Rabanan uproot the Kidushin retroactively, then if the brother of the husband later marries the woman (who is Asur to him as "Eshes Achiv"), the Kidushin should take effect mid'Oraisa (and she should require a Get if she wants to leave him) since she is not his "Eshes Ach!" Is that indeed the Halachah?
Another question is that if the Rabanan are able to remove Kidushin in such a manner, then why do they not use it in a broader context -- such as to permit Agunos to remarry? For example, in a case where a husband drowns in
the sea ("Mayim sh'Ein Lahem Sof") and there is no positive testimony that he is dead, the Halachah is that his wife may never remarry. The Rabanan should permit her to remarry by exercising their authority to uproot the
(a) TOSFOS in Gitin (33a) says that it is true that where the Rabanan uproot the Kidushin, a child who is a Mamzer due to the Kidushin becomes legitimate, and the woman becomes exempt from punishment for committing adultery (and, presumably, if she marries the brother of her husband, the Kidushin with him will take effect). However, a person cannot take advantage of this right of the Rabanan in order to intentionally correct the status of a Mamzer. In such a case -- where a man intentionally sends a Get to his wife with a Shali'ach and then annuls the Get in order to save his wife from punishment or to make his wife's illegitimate children legitimate – the Rabanan do *not* uproot the Kidushin. They only uproot the Kidushin when a man annuls the Get innocently, with no ulterior motives.
As for why the Rabanan do not exercise their authority to uproot Kidushin in order to permit Agunos to remarry, the RAMBAN and RASHBA explain that the Rabanan exercise this power only where there was some form of Get that was already given. Even though the Get itself is not valid, the Rabanan uproot the Kidushin based on the giving of the Get.
This also seems to be the intention of RASHI here who repeatedly writes that the Rabanan uproot the Kidushin "when a Get is given." (Rashi in Shabbos (155b) writes that the reason the Rabanan permitted a woman to remarry based on the testimony of a single witness is because of the principle of "Afke'inhu." Here, Rashi explains why the Rabanan do not apply "Afke'inhu" to permit Agunos in other situations. Rashi is explaining that in the case of a single witness who testifies that the husband died, there is at least some sort of testimony that he died, and thus there is a foothold for the Rabanan to uproot the Kidushin. According to Rashi, wherever there is some form of Get or some form of testimony of death, the Rabanan can apply "Afke'inhu.")
(b) The RAMBAN and RE'AH write that although the Rabanan uprooted the Kidushin d'Oraisa, they nevertheless established in its place a Kidushin d'Rabanan. Therefore, the child born to the woman from another man will
still be a Mamzer d'Rabanan, and the relatives of the husband will be prohibited to the woman mid'Rabanan. Similarly, she will be prohibited mid'Rabanan to marry a Kohen.
(c) The Rishonim here (RAMBAN, RASHBA) and in Gitin quote the RASHBAM (see also PNEI YEHOSHUA here) who suggests that when a condition of the Get is fulfilled against the husband's will, and when a husband annlus a Get after having sent it with a Shali'ach, the Kidushin is not uprooted retroactively,
but rather it is uprooted from now on, "mi'Kan ul'Haba." (See also SHITAH MEKUBETZES who quotes the Rashbam as found in a marginal note in a manuscript of Rashi's commentary.)
The Rashbam explains that the Gemara means that the Rabanan have the right to uproot the Kidushin retroactively, and if they do so, all of the Be'ilos retroactively become Be'ilos of Z'nus. Since nobody wants his Be'ilos to become Be'ilos Z'nus, when he gives a Get with a condition, he has in mind that even if the condition is fulfilled later against his will, he still wants the Get to be valid. Similarly, when a man annuls a Get, since he
knows that the Rabanan will make his Be'ilos into Be'ilos Z'nus if the Get is annulled, he does not really want to annul the Get.
The Ramban asks that according to this, in a case where a woman is only betrothed (with Erusin), and her husband gives her a Get on condition or annuls a Get that he sent with a Shali'ach, the Kidushin *should* be
uprooted retroactively, since the man has not had relations with his wife and thus has no fear that his Be'ilos will be made into Be'ilos Z'nus! The Ramban answers that even though there was no Be'ilah, the husband has in
mind that the Get should take effect even if the condition is fulfilled b'Ones, because he knows that if he does not want it to work, it will not gain anything for him (since the Kidushin will still be uprooted against his will). Therefore, he intends for the Get to take effect no matter what.
d RASHI cites a fourth explanation in the name of "all of my teachers."
This explanation is actually found in PERUSH RABEINU GERSHOM in Bava Basra . He explains that all Kidushin nowadays is only mid'Rabanan in any case, and that is why the Rabanan are able to uproot it from now on. Rabeinu Gershom asserts that Kidushei Kesef  are mid'Rabanan, while Kidushei Bi'ah -- which is mid'Oraisa -- cannot make a Kidushin d'Oraisa nowadays since the Rabanan prohibited being Mekadesh a woman with Bi'ah . The Rabanan went further and said that since everyone is "Mekadesh Al Da'as d'Rabanan," all Kidushei Bi'ah does not work mid'Oraisa nowadays .
Rashi and the other Rishonim ask strong questions on the explanation of Rabeinu Gershom.
1. First, how can he say that Kidushei Kesef  are mid'Rabanan, when Kidushei Kesef is derived from a Gezeirah Shavah  and is thus clearly d'Oraisa?
Apparently, Rabeinu Gershom learns that this Gezeirah Shavah is not an actual Gezeirah Shavah mid'Oraisa, but is only an Asmachta. 
2. Second, Rashi asks that we know that a Ne'arah Me'urasah is defined as a woman who was assumed to be a Besulah at the time of the Nesu'in, but was found to have had relations with another man while she was an Arusah. The Torah punishes such a woman with Sekilah. How can the Torah consider her to be a Besulah at the time of Nesu'in if, mid'Oraisa, there is no such thing as Kidushei Kesef or Kidushei Shtar? The only way she could have become an Arusah, mid'Oraisa, is through Kidushei Bi'ah, and thus it is not possible for there to be a case of Ne'arah Me'urasah!
Rabeinu Gershom apparently was not bothered by this question, because we could say that the Kidushin was done with a Bi'ah *she'Lo k'Darkah*. Such a Bi'ah serves to make the woman an Arusah, but it does not make her a Be'ulah and she remains a Besulah. 
3. Third, Rashi asks that according to Rabeinu Gershom, a woman who gets married with Kidushei Bi'ah should be permitted to leave her husband without a Get. Rabeinu Gershom apparently learned that although the Rabanan removed the Kidushin d'Oraisa, they did substitute in its place a Kidushin d'Rabanan which does requires a Get.
Kesuvos 003: Retroactive release אפקיעו רבנן קידושין
Rabbi David Willig asked:
Rava says ein ones b'gittin. this i understand to mean that the get is valid as a get despite the oness. rava is saying that in the absence of any evidence of a d'oraisa positon one way or the other, the rabbanan, in the interest of judicial certainty  will rule the get valid at the time the t'nai expires.
kol mekadesh al d'aatah d'rabbanan mekadesh means the parties accept this position and afkinon rabbanan l'kidushei minei refers to now, not retroactively. what does b'eilas znus have to do with anything?
no one is changing the status l'mafreia?
David Willig, Perth Amboy NJ, USA
The Kollel replies:
As I understand it, you are asking why the Gemara assumes that the only way for the Rabanan to remove Kidushin is retroactive. Why can "Kol d'Mekadesh" not be applied to remove it from here on? An exellent question.
I see only two ways for "Kol d'Mekadesh..." to possibly remove Kidushin from here on :
 By having every person make their Kidushin, from the start, in such a way that it should "expire" as soon as the Rabbanan want it to.
I don't think this can be done. Kidushin doesn't just expire; it needs a Get to end it .
 The other, more serious, suggestion is that just as Kidushin is enacted according to the wishes of the Rabanan, so too Gerushin.  If so, when a person gives a Get, let us assume he wants it to take effect as the Rabanan wish. Therefore, even if the Get does not work mid'Oraisa , the Rabanan can make it work, and end the Kidushin from here on through "Kol d'Megaresh..." Why doesn't the Gemara accept this possibility?
The answer is that the Gemara never applies Kol d'Mekadesh  to *effect* a Kinyan. The clause only allows the Rabanan to *annul* a Kidushin or Gerushin that was made. They cannot effect Gerushin with that principle, they can only retroactively annul the Kidushin through that application of that principle in order to release the wife from her husband. 
Be well, Mordecai Kornfeld.
HALACHAH: THE "BI'AH" OF A NOCHRI
OPINIONS: During a era when the wicked regime instituted that every Jewish Besulah was to be defiled by the local governor before her wedding, people started getting married on Tuesday to avoid the decree . The Gemara says that those who are defiled by the governor are nevertheless permitted to live with their husbands afterwards , except for the wives of Kohanim, who become Asur to their husbands even when raped.
It is clear from the Gemara that if a woman lived with the Nochri governor willfully, she will would *not* be permitted to her husband. What is the Halachah if a married, Jewish woman is Mezanah with a Nochri? Does she
become prohibited to her husband, and to the one with whom she was Mezaneh ? The Rishonim discuss this question at length.
 RABEINU TAM  writes that the Bi'ah of a Nochri is like that of a Behemah. Therefore, a woman is not Chayav Misah if she willingly lives with a Nochri while she is an Eshes Ish. This is also the opinion of the BA'AL HA'MA'OR and the MILCHAMOS in Sanhedrin .
However, the reason they give for exempting her from Misah is that the Torah says that only a man who commits adultery with "Eshes Re'ehu"  is Chayav Misah, and when a Nochri commits adultery with a Jewish man's wife, she is not called "Eshes Re'ehu."
Rabeinu Tam adds that for the same reason, if the Nochri later converts, he is permitted to marry the woman with whom he lived, even though normally a woman who commits adultery is prohibited both to her husband and to the adulterer. In this case, the Nochri, after converting, may marry her, because his Bi'ah with her was like the Bi'ah of a Behemah which is not the type of Bi'ah that can make him Asur to her, and thus when he converts he
may marry her.
The RIVAM  understands that Rabeinu Tam means to permit not only the Nochri to the wife, but even the husband is permitted to his wife after she was Mezanah with a Nochri. However, he strongly opposes this ruling based on our Gemara that implies that if the woman lived with the Nochri willingly, she becomes Asur to her husband.
It is possible, though, that Rabeinu Tam had a different intention. Rabeinu Tam means only that the woman is permitted to the adulterer, but *not* to her husband nor to a Kohen, as the SHITAH MEKUBETZES  writes. The logic behind this distinction is that since the Nochri's Bi'ah is not the same as that of a Jew because of the element of "Zirmas Susim Zirmasam," the woman is not Chayav Misah for such a Bi'ah. For the same reason, the adulterer is not prohibited to the woman, because his Bi'ah was not the type of Bi'ah which the Torah punishes with Misah, and we do not find that such a Bi'ah could make her Asur to the adulterer.
She *is* Asur to her husband, though, because she was not faithful to him, and the Torah says that if a woman is unfaithful to her husband she becomes Asur to him; it makes no difference whether she was unfaithful to him with a Nochri or with a Jew. In short, the Isur to her husband depends on her being unfaithful, while the Isur to the adulterer depends on the Bi'ah being considered a normal Bi'ah. 
In fact, this is exactly the opinion of RABEINU YECHIEL . Rabeinu Yechiel says that if a Nochri lives with a Jewish Eshes Ish, he is permitted to marry her after he converts, since he was permitted to her at the time he had relations with her , and when he converted he became like a "Katan sh'Nolad." This implies that if he had been Asur to her while he was a Nochri, the Isur would *not* have been revoked because of "Ger sh'Nisgayer k'Katan sh'Nolad Dami."
Accordingly, Rabeinu Tam is giving the reason why the Isur does not apply to the Nochri while he is a Nochri, and Rabeinu Yechiel is adding why the Isur does not apply to him when he converts. Indeed, the CHASAM SOFER and TOSFOS YOM HA'KIPURIM  explain that Rabeinu Tam means to say the same as
b The ROSH  also rules that when a woman is Mezanah with a Nochri and then he converts, she is permitted to marry him, like Rabeinu Tam says, but for a different reason than that of Rabeinu Tam. He asserts that we only prohibit a woman to her adulterer if she was permitted to him before the Z'nus. Since she is prohibited to marry a Nochri even before the Z'nus, the Torah does not prohibit her to him when she was Mezanah with him, and even when he converts she is permitted to him.
The TERUMAS HA'DESHEN  discusses what the Rosh would hold if a woman was Mezanah with the husband of her sister, and then her sister later died. Following the logic of the Rosh, she should be permitted to the adulterer, because at the time of the Z'nus, she was prohibited to him .
The Terumas ha'Deshen concludes that even the Rosh permits her only to a Nochri, because a Nochri is *always* Asur to the woman. If he converts, he is not the same person anymore because he is like a "Katan sh'Nolad."
Therefore the Isur to the adulterer will not apply when the Nochri converts. In contrast, the husband of her sister is only prohibited to her as long as her sister is alive. Therefore, when she commits adultery with him, the Isur
to marry her adulterer will apply.
c The RIVAM rejects Rabeinu Tam's argument entirely. He rules that the woman *is* prohibited to the Nochri with whom she committed adultery.
HALACHAH: The SHULCHAN ARUCH  rules like Rabeinu Yechiel and the Terumas ha'Deshen, that the woman is permitted to the Nochri when he converts, but she is not permitted to the husband of her sister after her sister dies.
UPROOTING A "TAKANAH D'RABANAN" IN THE FACE OF DANGER
QUESTION: The Gemara says that if a wicked regime were to institute that anyone who marries a Besulah on Wednesday is to be killed, the Rabanan would uproot the Takanah d'Rabanan and would not require a Besulah to get married on Wednesday.
However, later the Gemara says that if the wicked regime decrees that any Besulah who gets married on Wednesday must live with the governor first, then even though there is a concern that some women, the Tzenu'os, might give up their lives, the Rabanan do not uproot the Takanah of getting married on Wednesday, because "evil decrees are wont to be retracted, and we do not uproot a Takanah d'Rabanan because of an evil decree which will
eventually be retracted."
If so, why are the Rabanan prepared to uproot their Takanah if the regime decrees that whoever gets married on Wednesday will be killed? That, too, is an evil decree that will eventually pass!
 TOSFOS  explains that if the governor makes a decree to kill anyone who gets married on Wednesday, then the Rabanan would not have to uproot their Takanah, because they could institute a different day for getting married instead of Wednesday. Such a change would satisfy the governor, since he would be content with the knowledge that he was able to cause a change in the Halachah of the Jews. Since his intention in making such a decree was clearly to prevent the Jews from observing the Halachah, it will not bother him if he finds that everyone is getting married on another day.
However, when the governor wants to live with every Besulah who gets married on Wednesday, he is obviously interested in personal pleasure and not in abolishing the Jews' Halachah.  If the Rabanan were to institute that Besulos should get married on Tuesday, the governor would just change his evil decree to take all the woman who get married on Tuesday. Therefore, the Rabanan would have to avoid instituting a new day for getting married and abolish the Takanah of getting married on a specific day. Since they do not abolish any Takanah because of an evil decree, the Takanah remains.
This appears to be the intention of Rashi as well .
b The SHITAH MEKUBETZES explains that if the evil decree was to *kill* people who get married on Wednesday, then the Rabanan would certainly have annulled their enactment in order to save lives. But if the decree was only that the Besulos must be defiled by the governor -- and there was no definite danger to lives but only a *possible* danger that a modest woman might give up her life in order to avoid living with the governor – the Rabanan would not have annulled their enactment, since there is a possibility that *no* lives will be lost by the time that the evil decree is revoked. 
c The RITVA answers that in the case where the decree was that each Besulah must be defiled by the governor, the Rabanan did not uproot the decree, because the only concern is that some women will give up their lives Lifnim mi'Shuras ha'Din, beyond the letter of the law. For such a concern, the Rabanan do not abolish an enactment. If, however, there would be a concern that a person would have to give up his life according to the letter of the law, then the Rabanan would certainly abolish their enactment.
As the SHITAH MEKUBETZES here points out, it seems that the Ritva is following his opinion elsewhere , where he writes that for any Mitzvah for which a person is not required to give up his life, it is *prohibited* for him to give up his life.  Accordingly, the Rabanan did not find it necessary to abolish the Takanah because of women who are acting improperly by giving up their lives when they are not supposed to do so . This is the "Lifnim mi'Shuras ha'Din" to which the Ritva is referring -- an erring act, not a laudable one.
Kesuvos 003: Marriage of a Besulah b'She'as ha'Sakanah
Aaron Kaplan asked:
On 3b we ask why we dont teach the "tzneuot" that "ones" is ok so it wont be a "sacana", and then AFTER we answer that possibilty we say why not just get rid of the "takana".
This seems to imply that it would be better to have her have "biah" with the "hegmon" then get rid of the "takana"?!
Aaron Kaplan, Chicago, Il
Reuven Miller asked:
Chazal did not want to uproot their takana because of the hegmon. Instead the gemarra tells us that the custom  became not observe the takana and Chazal did not "protest".
My question : What would beis din say to a couple that came to ask:
Should we observe the takanna ansd marry Wed night even though the hagmon would take the kallah or should we go against the takana and marry Monday night thereby avoiding the hamon?
Reuven Miller Jerusalem, Israel
The Kollel replies:
The fact that Chazal did not repeal the Takanah and even ruled for those who asked that the Takanah was still operational, is not to say that they preferred a Bi'ah to the Hegmon over a Nisuin on a day other than Wednesday.
However, the Takanah is in effect until repealed and there must be a Halachic reason to repeal the Takanah. Since, in actuality, even if the unfortunate happened, and the bride was taken to the Hegmon involuntarily she remains Mutar to her husband, Chazal did not find it neccessary to repeal a pre-existing Takanah due to a temporary unfortunate state. It is safe to assume that had the Sakanah existed prior to the Takanah, Chazal would never had made the Takanah.
The important thing to note is that the Takanos of Chazal were not mere suggestions, but rather Halachah Pesukah, and were not easily repealed. Just as there were binding rules on how to enact a Takanah there were strict rules how and when to repeal them, and as long as they were in force Chazal were bound to them. However, unlike a Din Torah, Chazal were able to overlook them on an individual basis, in certain cases such as here where it was unlikely that the people could abide. Dov Zupnik
Just to add a short note to Rav Zupnick's excellent answer, Rashi  and Tosfos  discuss what Beis Din would tell her if she asked l'Chatchilah what to do. Rashi clearly rules that they would tell her to marry on a different day.
Even though Tosfos says that Beis Din will not tell her to marry a different day, he only means that *as a Beis Din* they would not tell her that, since they could not present such a ruling. However, the Dayan can certainly take her aside, out of court, and give her some "practical advice", that "nowadays, people are marrying on days other than Wednesday -- maybe you should follow their lead." 
- והוי גיטא
- דלמא אניס ואינו גט ותדאג להינשא
- וכשיבא ויאמר נאנסתי נמצא גט בטל ובניה מן האחרון ממזרים לפיכך אמרו יהא גט
- שמצינו טענת אונס מן התורה שנאמר (דברים כב כו) 'ולנערה לא תעשה דבר'
- כל המקדש אשה
- על דעת שהנהיגו חכמי ישראל בישראל הוא מקדשה, שיהיו קיימין קידושין לפי דברי חכמים - ויהיו בטילים לפי דברי חכמים, על ידי גיטין שהכשירו חכמים
- כשיבא גט כזה אחריהם
- למימר אפקעתא
- דנימא: גט זה עוקר הקידושין ועושה מעות מתנה מעיקרן
- מאי אפקעתא מעיקרא איכא? בשלמא על ידי גט כשר - אף על פי שהקידושין קיימים עד עכשיו, גזירת הכתוב היא שהגט כורתו ומתיר איסורו מכאן ולהבא; אבל זה, שאינו גט מן התורה ואתה מכשירו מפני דעתו של זה שקידשה על דעת חכמים ושביטלו על פי חכמים - צריך אתה לומר שמעיקרן לא יהו קידושין! ואי קדיש בביאה ואתה עוקר קידושין למפרע - מה תהא על ביאתו
- למפרע על ידי גט שהוא מדבריהם
- ויש בהן כח לעשות כן, שהרי הוא תלה בהן. שמעתי כל רבותי מפרשים 'דקדיש בכספא' - דקידושי דרבנן נינהו, ואי אפשר לומר כן: חדא: דגזירה שוה היא 'קיחה' 'קיחה' משדה עפרון (קידושין ב א), וכל הלמד מגזירה שוה - כמו שכתוב מפורש הוא לכל דבר! ועוד: אי דרבנן נינהו - היאך סוקלין על ידו? ומביאין חולין לעזרה על שגגתן? וסוף סוף כי קא משנינן 'שויוה רבנן לבעילתו בעילת זנות' - על כרחך צריך אתה לפרש כמו שפירשתי: שהקידושין נעקרין מעיקרן, ולא מכאן ולהבא. והמפרש לומר 'שויוה רבנן לכל מקדשי בביאה בעילת זנות' - טעות גמור הוא, ובא להתיר אשת איש המתקדשת בביאה בלא גט מן הטעם הזה! ולא מצינו זאת בהתלמוד.A
- א'לפיכך' קאי, דטענינן טענת אונס בתנאי הגט להפקיעו
- כלומר שקביעות כל הימים שוה
- שיהא טורח בסעודה שלשה ימים
- אם טרח לפני השבת, ותיקן צורכי סעודה - כונסה באחד בשבת או בשני בשבת
- היכן שנינו 'שקדו' דמקשינן לה הכא? אי משום דאמר שמואל לעיל - לית לן לאותביה מינה לאמוראה אחרינא
- לקמן מפרש לה
- בשביל אותה סכנה, ואין צריך לעקור בשבילה תקנת חכמים אלא יום אחד, ויהיה טורח מיהת שני ימים בצורכי סעודה
- לקמן מפרש
- אם ביאה ראשונה היא מפרישין אותה ממנו לילי שבת
- בתמיה: סכנת נפשות היא ואת אמרת נהגו... לכנוס ביום שלישי אבל מיעקר רביעי לגמרי לא עקרו
- ויתקנו להם ימים אחרים
- דנבעלת באונס אינה נאסרת על בעלה, דילפינן לקמן בפרק רביעי (נא,ב) מ'והיא לא נתפשה' (במדבר ה יג), ולא לימסרו נפשייהו למיתה!
- דאי מקילינן להו - עבדי ברצון, ונאסרות על בעליהן
- שנאסרות על בעליהן אף באונס; ואינהו מסרן נפשייהו למיתה: דאשת כהן שנאנסה אסורה לבעלה, ולקמן בפרק רביעי (שם) ילפינן לה
- הואיל וזמנין דאיכא סכנה
- של הגויים, או: שמדא
- של הגויים, או: שמדא
- כיון דידע שהתחילו לנהוג בשלישי
- כיון דלאו קביעות גמור הוא על ידי תקנת בית דין - ספיקא היא לו אם יש נישואין היום בעיר, ולא עקר נפשיה לבא בעיר
- משמע רובם נהגו
- לא גרסינן 'לכתחילה'; והכי קא מתמה: הכא 'מותר' קתני, דמשמע: אם ימָלֵך איש יחידי בבית דין - יתירו לו, אבל 'נהגו' לא קתני!
- ויחטפו צורכי סעודה מאשר ימצאו
- לאחר רביעי
- עד יום רביעי של שבת הבא
- למה נתיר לו לקדום כל כך [ליום שני], שלא יטריח בסעודה אלא יום אחד, ומיעַקרא תקנתא דשקדו
- חיל משרתיו המכינים לו צורכי סעודה; בלשון לעז הירניי"ש [חיל אספקה]
- חתן שמת אביו בשני, ואין יכול להמתין עד למחר שצריך להשהות את המת עד שיכנסו לחופה
- במים, שיהא ראוי לשתיה, ושוב אינו מתקיים
- דוקא נקט אביו של חתן שהוא הטורח בצורכי סעודה ואמה של כלה היא המכינה לה תכשיטין; לפיכך אם יעבור המועד שוב אין מֵכִין להם
- והתירו להם להכניס את המת לחדר שלא יקברוהו: דאם כן - חלה אבילות על האבל בסתימת הגולל, כדלקמן, ושוב לא יוכל לכנוס עד שיעבור האבילות
- and Kidushei Shtar
- Kidushin 12b
- and it only makes a Kidushin d'Rabanan
- Once the Rabanan instituted that one can be Mekadesh a woman with Kidushei Kesef, it became a an act of effrontery to be Mekadesh a woman with Bi'ah. Therefore, when the Rabanan instituted Kidushei Kesef, they also instituted that a person may not be Mekadesh with Bi'ah and they annulled that form of Kidushin, based on the premise that when a person gets married, he does so according to the will of the Rabanan.
- and Kidushei Shtar
- Kidushin 2a
- The same applies to Kidushei Shtar, which is learned by comparing it to a Get (Kidushin 9b). Rabeinu Gershom understands that comparison to be only an Asmachta.
- See in full the Gemara in Kidushin 9b. Even though the Gemara there rejects this possibility, perhaps Rabeinu Gershom understands that the Sugyos are arguing.
- tznuos u'prutzos
- and not retroactively
- Nedarim 29a
- This is not only logically sound, it is actually the truth, according to Teshuvos Rashba cited by the Gilyon ha'Shas and a few other Rishonim.
- because the Tenai was fulfilled
- or d'Megaresh
- Kol d'Mekadesh is just a *clause* in a Kinyan, not a Kinyan in its own right.
- since the officials knew that the Chachamim had instituted that a Besulah get married only on Wednesday
- because the act was one of Ones
- if, for instance, he later converts to Judaism
- cited by TOSFOS DH v'Lidrosh
- "the wife of one's *fellow* man"
- cited in Tosfos, ibid.
- We might also ask that if Rabeinu Tam mean to say that Z'nus with a Nochri does not prohibit the woman to her husband or to the adulterer, the woman should also be permitted to her husband if he is a Kohen. Yet our Gemara
says that she is prohibited to her husband if he is a Kohen! However, we could answer this question by saying that the prohibition to a Kohen is not because of Tum'ah, that she was defiled, which is the reason for her
prohibition to her husband and to the adulterer. Rather it is because of the Isur of "Zonah." This Sugya holds that even Bi'ah b'Ones makes a woman a Zonah (see Yevamos 56b and 59b).
- DH v'Ivra
- See MISHNEH L'MELECH, Hilchos Yibum 6:19, who discusses the extent to which we compare the woman's status to her husband with her status to the adulterer.
- cited by the RITVA here and by the MORDECHAI in Sanhedrin #720
- since he was a Nochri
- Yoma 82b
- 1:4, and in TOFOS HA'ROSH
- because of "Achos Ishto"
- EH 178:19
- DH Takanah
- This also explains why there is no
requirement "to be killed and not to transgress," in this case, even though the Halachah is that when a Nochri tries to make us change any religious practice with the express intention to abolish the Jewish faith, there is a
requirement "to be killed and not to transgress."
- DH v'Ne'akrei
- See also PNEI YEHOSHUA.
- This is also the ruling of the RAMBAM in Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah 5:4.
- and it is prohibited to do so
- because of "prutzot"...
- I think she’d be a lot happier with a smaller wedding and no "hegmon" involved
- nahagu ha-am
- ד"ה התם נהגו and ד"ה הכא
- ד"ה ותו
- That is what Chazal call "Nahagu," an action that
is condoned by the Rabanan and they do not try to stop it, although they cannot rule that way as a court for the reasons Rav Zupnick gave.